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Abstract Recent developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning have
spurred interest in the growing field of AI safety, which studies how to prevent
human-harming accidents when deploying AI systems. This paper thus explores
the intersection of AI safety with evolutionary computation, to show how safety
issues arise in evolutionary computation and how understanding from evolutionary
computational and biological evolution can inform the broader study of AI safety.
1 Introduction
As the capabilities and pervasiveness of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelli-
gence (AI) increasingly affect society, there is increasing concern about the safety of
such systems, i.e. the potential of accidental harm from implementation errors and
unintended consequences in ML algorithms. As a result, there has been increasing
interest in the nascent field of AI safety [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], which seeks to understand
and solve the technical challenges in developing and deploying AI that does what it
is intended to do. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the study of AI safety
intersects with that of evolutionary computation (EC), to both highlight an exciting
and important set of safety problems within EC, and to suggest that evolution and
EC have important insights that could benefit the general study of AI safety.
To frame the problem of AI safety, we adopt the framework of Amodei et al. [1],
which defines AI safety as concerned with accidents in ML systems, and defines five
problems within three broad categories of issues: (1) specifying the wrong objective
function, (2) making safe and efficient use of a true but expensive objective (e.g.
human feedback), and (3) how to improve or adapt safely while interacting with the
real world. A running example in that paper, which we adopt here, describes a robot
with the task of cleaning an office using common tools; we modify the example to
assume that the controller for this robot has been evolved, i.e. with an EC technique
like neuroevolution or genetic programming (GP; [7]) in the setting of evolutionary
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robotics (ER; [8, 9]). While this running example is posed in the reinforcement learn-
ing setting of ER, similar issues can arise whenever an EC-trained artifact interacts
with the real world; for example, a credit-scoring system trained with GP symbolic
regression (e.g. as in Ong et al. [10]) when deployed might have enact unintended
consequences on the real-world borrowers its decisions affect, e.g. by potentially in-
ferring (and biasing decisions from) ethically and/or legally-problematic borrower
traits.
One motivation for this chapter is to draw attention within EC to a selection
of interesting and important concrete research problems (as introduced by Amodei
et al. [1]), in hopes of encouraging progress towards one of EC’s aspirations: to pro-
vide mature and reliably safe solutions for real-world AI and ML problems. As EC
systems are increasingly trained, refined, and applied in the real-world, it becomes
necessary to deal with real-world complications that are often side-stepped in closed-
world research benchmarks; grappling with these issues is thus a necessary step for
EC to transition into a reliable approach for safely solving real-world problems. For
example, if evolution is occurring in an environment alongside humans (e.g. evolv-
ing a robot controller that interacts with people in an office setting) much care is
needed to design an appropriate fitness function that at least does not cause harm in
its early incarnations; in contrast, fitness functions in more traditional closed-world
ER simulations often undergo many iterations of free-form debugging, with no real
danger or cost (beyond wasted time and computation), where initial attempts often
create highly-unexpected outcomes [11]. To enable reliable real-world deployment
of EC, it may be useful to come up with new automated design procedures, to import
tools from AI safety in statistical ML, or to perform new and directed EC research
on solving technical safety problems.
A complementarymotivation is to highlight problems or applications of AI safety
for which EC techniques might be particularly well-suited to make significant con-
tributions. For example, the subfields of quality diversity (QD; [12, 13]) and open-
ended evolution [14, 15] might provide a natural mechanism to create a diverse set
of test-scenarios to illuminate potential long-tail failures of ML systems that might
otherwise go unidentified (e.g. the fooling images work of Nguyen et al. [16] shows
how EC can automatically identify diverse visual patterns that a deep neural net-
work will confidently misidentify). In other words, while most current AI safety
work is conducted with traditional statistical ML (e.g. gradient-based deep learning
approaches), EC might bring new ideas and techniques to bear on such problems.
A final motivation is to consider if and how natural evolution solved problems
similar to those raised by AI safety. For example, evolution has designed various
means of collaboration within and between species that can embody a minimization
of negative side-effects among the behavior of social animals or mutalistic species
(although of course, there are many examples of antagonistic behavior as well, e.g.
the ubiquity of predator-prey relationship). Additionally, evolution has uncovered
ways to “explore safely” (for some definition of safety) both across an evolutionary
timescale (i.e. through the evolution of evolvability, i.e. evoluton acting to improve
variation) and an individual organism’s lifetime (i.e. through the complementary
instincts of curiosity and fear [17]). The hope is that biological inspiration might
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point the way towards potential solutions to these kinds of safety problems in EC or
in ML at large.
The conclusion is that AI safety is likely to be a growing field of interest in
coming years that offers a range of interesting technical challenges, and that EC
may both have important insights to offer and benefits to gain from research in that
community.
2 Background
The next sections describe the field of AI safety, and how EC is applied in the real
world, which helps to understand safety concerns from an EC perspective.
2.1 AI Safety
The field of AI safety [1, 2] seeks to pose and solve technical challenges involved
in developing AI that does what it is intended to do. The hope is to help foresee
and avoid harmful accidents that might result from good-intentionedAI gone astray.
While the name AI safety naturally evokes ideas of direct physical safety (e.g. how
to make sure there are sufficient guard-rails that prevent a robotic arm from acci-
dentally hitting a human), the problems studied in AI safety also encompass more
abstract and broad concerns, ranging from the immediate and short-term (e.g. how
can a mobile robot driven by reinforcement learning continually improve its policy
by exploring, without taking any catastrophic actions, such as those that cause harm
to itself, to the environment, or humans), to speculative concerns about the far fu-
ture (e.g. how to make sure an AI that surpassed human intelligence would still be
controllable and aligned with our interests).
One central challenge in AI safety (of importance both to short and long-term
concerns) is known as the value alignment problem, i.e. how to align a computa-
tional agent’s incentives with our own. This problem might appear at first simple,
because as designers of agents we have complete control over their incentives. How-
ever, such alignment remains an unsolved technical challenge: Currently we do not
know how in practice to algorithmically specify (or learn from data) the complexity
of what humans care about, e.g. our moral intuitions, common-sense knowledge,
and cultural norms, all of which can potentially come to bear upon what we intend
for a computational agent to do. In other words, in EC there is yet no procedure to
specify a correct and complete fitness function that encompasses all the background
context that could be important for a system that interacts with humans and society.
More concretely, even for an AI system that interacts with the real world in very lim-
ited ways, it is still often a challenge to design a fitness function that truly measures
or incentivizes correct behavior [11]. Indeed, the typical paradigm in AI remains
to specify a fixed and relatively simple objective function (e.g. a fitness function in
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EC) that is then optimized through search; however, as practitioners in EC are well-
aware, an intuitive fitness function can often be optimized in unexpected ways [11].
While there exist candidate approaches to value alignment [6, 3, 4], the problem at
core currently remains unsolved.
Interestingly, even if incentives are aligned, i.e. the learning system is provided
with the correct objective function, how to successfully (and safely) optimize that
objective function is still a difficult and unsolved problem in its own right. For exam-
ple, a reinforcement learning agent that is given the correct objective to optimize can
still make mistakes while it is being optimized (e.g. it can make harmful mistakes
while exploring how to improve its policy); or, the objective might be challenging to
optimize (e.g. it might instantiate a fitness landscape with many local optima), and
the locally-optimal policies that search converges to might not be value-aligned.
One useful framework for categorizing technical challenges in AI safety comes
from Amodei et al. [1], which divides safety problems into five categories: avoid-
ing negative side effects, reward hacking, scalable oversight, safe exploration, and
robustness to distributional shift. We adopt this framework in this paper for relating
AI safety problems to EC and evolution, and later in this paper describe each of
these problems in detail and how they emerge in EC.
One general consideration for AI safety is that it is most relevant when con-
sidering applying AI algorithms to real-world situations, where human well-being,
broadly speaking (e.g. including not only physical safety, but also social harm from
biased high-stakes decisions [18] or offense from insensitive classifications [19]),
might be at stake. Thus the next section reviews common paradigms for applying
EC to the real world.
2.2 EC and the Real World
While there are many different motivations for studying EC, including to under-
stand the creative potential of biological evolution algorithmically for its own sake,
researchers in EC often explicitly aim towards real-world applications of their ideas,
or at least paint a viable path towards how algorithmic improvementsmight be trans-
lated into real-world value. Below we consider how such translation generally works
in different learning settings (i.e. supervised vs. reinforcement learning).
When EC is applied to supervised learning settings, i.e. training where the task
is to predict or classify over a labeled training set, it is important to recall that su-
pervised training performance is rarely an end in itself; while improved accuracy
on a benchmark is often a crucial consideration for publishing a paper for symbolic
regression [20] or neural classification [21] models, such accuracy is only practi-
cally important insofar as it feeds into the downstream task the model is applied
towards (e.g. a classification model of credit-worthiness might be applied to decide
or influence loan decisions). While improved accuracy will likely contribute to such
use cases, it will not take into account the nuances of the domain (e.g. the differing
impact of different kinds of mistakes [19]).
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Thus, while such applications of supervised learning might at first not seem
relevant to AI safety, nearly always, the objective that a supervised-learning EC
model is trained towards (e.g. classification accuracy) serves only as a proxy for
the true downstream objective (e.g. efficient loan allocations that abide by legal and
moral norms). Notably, limitations of such a proxy are well-known, e.g. the fair-
ness, accountability, and transparency community within ML has highlighted how
maximizing training accuracy can result in models that base decisions on morally-
unacceptable criteria [22, 18]; this kind of gap between the proxy and the true ob-
jective can be seen as a manifestation of the general value alignment problem, and
techniques for minimizing such a gap highlight how AI safety research can be rele-
vant to EC-based supervised learning.
When EC is instead applied to robotics or reinforcement learning, evolution most
often occurs within simulated environments, with the idea that policies trained in
simulation can subsequently be transferred to reality [23, 24], and potentially fur-
ther evolved in the real world. The reasons for training in simulation include that
real-world evaluations can be slow, tedious, and expensive, and can risk damage to
hardware (like a robot) and to the broader environment (like humans coexisting with
the robot); simulation enables much more convenient large-scale experimentation
(given sufficient computation), although both how to design accurate simulations
for complicated domains and how to successfully transfer policies from simulation
to the real world remain challenging areas of research [25, 24, 23]. Safety concerns
in this paradigm can emerge from simulations that do not reveal safety-critical edge-
cases later encountered when models are deployed in the real-world, or from chang-
ing circumstances in reality (i.e. distributional shift) that are not accounted for in
simulation. Another paradigm in EC is embodied evolution [26], wherein evolution
is conducted in the real world, to circumvent the challenges of building accurate sim-
ulators and crossing the reality gap. In this setting, to the extent that evolved policies
interact with humans or can damage their robotic body or their environment, there
may be the need for expensive and potentially constant supervision (an AI safety is-
sue discussed in more detail later). In general, because there is never the protective
buffer of simulation between a policy and the real-world, safety considerations in
embodied evolution may be more challenging than in other settings.
The conclusion is that as EC strives and achieves greater real-world impact, there
will likely be a corresponding increased risk (albeit still potentially minor in many
domains) of unintentional harm, no matter the specific paradigm by which EC mod-
els are trained and deployed.
3 EC and Concrete AI Safety Problems
This section explores more concretely how ideas from evolution and EC intersect
with those from AI safety. We adopt the framework of Amodei et al. [1], which
identifies five classes of concrete problems that can cause AI accidents: avoiding
negative side effects, reward hacking, scalable oversight, safe exploration, and ro-
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bustness to distributional shift. For each of these five problems we introduce the
problem, describe how it can arise in EC, how it relates to various research areas
in EC, and what potential solutions might look like within EC or from ML at large.
Note that we will only sketch some connections to the broader study of AI safety
within ML; for more comprehensive surveys, see Amodei et al. [1] or Everitt et al.
[2].
3.1 Avoiding Negative Side Effects
The problem of negative side effects is that a fitness function that rewards achieving
a desired goal is often under-specified in practice, even if the conditions of achieving
that goal are correctly described. That is, there are many ways of accomplishing a
goal naively in the real world that humans would nonetheless find unacceptable. For
example, borrowing from Amodei et al. [1], a robot might knock over an expensive
vase en route to its destination; even if the robot arrives successfully at its destination
(its goal), the damage to the vase is an unacceptable negative byproduct of the robot
pursuing its goal.
If the fitness function does not penalize for breaking the vase, this could poten-
tially be viewed as a failure of the researcher to express the correct fitness function;
however, while we could attempt to anticipate and hard code into the fitness function
every negative contingency, there is a human tendency to overlook subtle possibil-
ities, and a tedium in attempting to enumerate in advance every possible harm the
robot could cause. Ideally, there would be a way to automatically (or with minimal
supervision) augment a goal-directed fitness function to penalize such undesired
impacts. The overarching challenge relates to the value alignment problem in AI
safety, in that there is much background context (e.g. about what objects in the envi-
ronment are fragile or important) that a human brings to their understanding of what
an acceptable solution is, which is difficult to effectively and exhaustively translate
into a fitness function (although some projects do aim to distill such background
knowledge [27]).
Interestingly, most EC and ER environments are constructed such that there is lit-
tle potential for negative side effects, because such considerations are often orthog-
onal to the research questions under study. That is, simulated environments in ER
are very often closed-world and spartan, containing only elements directly relevant
to the task at hand. For example, a common variety of ER task involves simulated
wheeled robots navigating through an enclosed environment containing only walls
and artifacts directly related to the task (e.g. a light switch that can be triggered, or
tokens that can be collection); negative side-effects are often avoided by definition:
The robot can not damage itself or anything of importance in its environment.
In ER and EC experiments that involve the real world, or interactingwith humans,
there is more potential for negative side-effects, although experimenters nearly al-
ways apriori minimize that possibility by design. For example, when transferring
policies evolved in simulation to the real world, the real world environment is often
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engineered to mimic the spartan simulated one, and often such transfers are one-off
experiments (i.e. the robot will not then be operating in an ongoing way) under in-
tensive supervision. However, despite the minimization by design of negative side
effects, the conclusion is that as (or if) EC and ER progresses, we likely will want or
need evolved agents to be deployed in complex open-world or human-coinhabited
environments; in such situations, the problem of negative side effects can no longer
be avoided. Thus, when aiming toward the real world, simulated environments may
need to be augmented to include the potential for negative side-effects (and for
learning to avoid them), or automated techniques for mitigating side-effects from
real-world deployment may need to be developed.
So far, the problem of negative side-effects appears to be an under-studied aspect
of how to scale EC, one that may provide exciting future research directions. One
possible paradigm for minimizing negative-side effects is to train EC agents through
interactive evolutionary computation (IEC; [28]), i.e. to involve humans directly in
the breeding process. Due to the problem of user fatigue in IEC [28], i.e. that the
task of breeding can become monotonous and exhausting, it is difficult to scale
IEC, which necessites learning surrogate models [29] and/or distributed IEC [30],
i.e. systems that involve many humans breeding in potentially uncoordinated ways.
Overall, the interaction of IEC with embodied evolution or reinforcement learning
in general (as in Woolley and Stanley [31]) could benefit from greater study from
a safety perspective. Current research directions in ML that address negative side
effects include objective functions that minimize change to the environment [32],
or algorithms that satisfice instead of unboundedly optimize [33] (motivated by the
idea that side-effects may often result from extreme optimization), both of which
could potentially be adapted for EC.
3.2 Reward Hacking
The problem of reward hacking, like that of negative side-effects, is caused by an
incompletely- or incorrectly-specified fitness function. While negative side-effects
are collateral damage incurred while successfully achieving the desired objective,
reward hacking is when optimization uncovers unexpected ways to maximize the
fitness function that do not achieve the desired objective. For example, if the true
objective of a cleaning robot is to clean the office, but its fitness function rewards
for each individual mess the robot cleans, the robot may discover that it maximizes
fitness by creating new messes that it can subsequently clean [1].
The phenomenon of reward hacking is familiar to most EC practitioners; nearly
all of us have encountered situations where an intuitive fitness function is maxi-
mized by counter-intuitive behavior. Indeed, that so many illuminating (and funny)
anecdotes of reward hacking existed in the EC community was one main inspira-
tion behind the crowd-sourced documentation effort of Lehman et al. [11], which
describes many reward-hacking examples. For example, take Karl Sims’ seminal
virtual creatures work [34]. In early attempts to evolve locomotion gaits by reward-
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ing forward motion, the result was not the desired natural gaits, but morphological
evolution towards tall rigid bodies that could exploit their potential energy by falling
or somersaulting forward.
Beyond EC, the challenge of constructing incentives for agents (like fitness func-
tions) that cannot be undermined is well known in other fields. For example, in eco-
nomics, Goodhart’s law [35] states that “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases
to be a good measure.” Similar understanding goes by the name of the principle-
agent problem in economics and political science [36], and similar challenges exist
in designing contracts in law [37]. Further, there are many historical examples of
perverse incentives, where an incentive to solve one problem instead exacerbates
it; for example, a French colonial program in Hanoi paid citizens for turning in rat
tails, in hopes of exterminating rats, but it instead led to farming rats [38]. This con-
silience of evidence suggests that designing incentives is generally hard, and that
humans are often overconfident about their ability to perform such a task well, fail-
ing to anticipate subtle loopholes instantiated by intuitive reward structures. In this
way, reward hacking in EC and ML is one manifestation of a more general problem.
In practice, reward hacking in EC is often solved through iteration. An intuitive
fitness function leads to surprising and undesirable (but often post-hoc understand-
able) outcomes, and the experimenter then attempts to modify the fitness function
to patch the problem, which potentially may lead to a different kind of exploit that
must also be patched. Interestingly, because these failed incentives can be viewed
as failures of the experimenter, and happen in the loop of scientific experimentation
that precedes a polished experimental setup, they are often not reported scientifi-
cally [11]; as a result, the prevalence and importance of reward hacking in EC may
be under-appreciated and understudied.
While frustrating, when evolution occurs in simulation reward hacking may not
cause harm much beyond wasted experimenter effort and time; however, the ability
for EC practitioners to quickly and safely explore new tasks, especially in settings
such as embodied evolution or reality-gap crossing, is undercut by the expertise and
trial-and-error needed to construct reliable fitness functions.
As in negative side-effects, IEC is one avenue for helping to overcome reward
hacking, by involving human judgment through dynamically assessing quality rather
than by crafting fixed incentive schemes; beyond directed human breeding, there is
also possibility for humans to supply other forms of guidance to further constrain or
replace traditional fitness functions, like demonstrations of acceptable behavior or
heuristic advice [39].
Such EC research directions can be seen as connected to similar potential so-
lutions in traditional ML, such as imitation learning [40], wherein an agent learns
how to imitate expert demonstrations of behavior; cooperative inverse reinforcement
learning [37], where a reinforcement learning agent cooperates with a human to dis-
cover and optimize the human’s preferences; or reward modeling [3], wherein a ma-
chine learning model is trained to predict human preferences (similar to surrogate
models used in IEC [29]. Exploring if and how such ML methods could apply to
EC (e.g. evolutionary imitation learning, or applying deep learning models to learn
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models of human preferences to drive evolution) may be a productive area of future
research.
3.3 Scalable Oversight
The problem of scalable oversight is that in EC and learning systems in general,
there is often expensive feedback that accurately reflects how acceptable a system is
behaving, but such feedback is too expensive to be applied as the primary incentive
that drives search. For example, an exact fitness measure for a cleaning robot might
require expensive manual testing of how much dirt is in a carpet before and after the
robot visits a particular room. Other proxymeasures may be more cheaply available,
such as a human giving a quick glance to a room, or by the robot measuring how
much dirt it is picking up; however, such proxies might exacerbate problems such
as negative side effects or reward hacking [1], e.g. a robot maximizing dirt picked
up might knock over a plant to gain access to more dirt, or a robot maximizing
human approval after a quick glance might hide messes under a rug. The issue is
how to efficiently and effectively apply combinations of cheap proxy signals with
occasional expensive feedback, to produce a practical (and well-behaved) learning
system.
One way the issue of scalable oversight emerges in EC is through the practical
construction of real-world fitness functions (e.g. fitness functions for fine-tuning
policies learned in simulation, or those used in embodied evolution). In other words,
when applying evolution in a real-world situation, what sensors are available on a
robot, what a human can easily evaluate, or how the environment can be augmented
with automated sensors to evaluate aspects of behavior (e.g. motion capture equip-
ment or ceiling-mounted cameras) will affect what fitness functions are possible to
automate, and the overall cost-effectiveness of executing different experiments. That
is, scalable oversight, like other AI safety issues, is often eliminated by design from
EC domains; experiments in which cheap proxy fitness evaluations are not possible
or in which they fail (due to reward hacking or negative side-effects) are unlikely
to be pursued or published. However, if progress could be made on enabling more
scalable oversight in EC, it might extend the range of what kinds of embodied evo-
lution or real-world fine-tuning could be performed, making it an interesting avenue
of research not only for safety reasons, but for expanding the complexity of domains
for which real-world EC could be applied.
The area of EC research closest to scalable oversight is that of surrogate-assisted
EC [29], wherein expensive-to-calculate fitness functions are approximated with
a learned model; of particular interest (for their potential efficiency) are surrogate
models that intelligently choose which points in the search space to subject to ex-
pensive ground-truth fitness queries. For example, Gaier et al. [41] applies Bayesian
optimization to enable data-efficient QD. An interesting direction for future research
would be to learn surrogates of expensive real-world fitness function calculations
that are derived from available sensor data (i.e. the surrogate would not model how
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points in the search space relate to expensive fitness scores, but how streams of sen-
sor data can produce effective proxies of ground-truth fitness); this seems to better
exploit available data, and intuitively seems more plausibly related to the process
by which humans derive cheap estimates of more complex measures. Another re-
lated area of EC study are methods that attempt to model which genomes are likely
to successfully cross the reality gap [24]; the reason is that there is an analogy be-
tween simulations (and their relation to reality) and proxy fitness measures (And
their relation to ground-truth fitness).
From a ML point of view, Amodei et al. [1] propose that a semi-supervised for-
mulation of reinforcement learning may be a productive paradigm for tackling scal-
able oversight. The idea is that an agent only receives reward information on a small
subset of its experience (as opposed to the traditional reinforcement learning setting
where reward is observed for each transition); in particular, the agent must learn
when to request expensive reward information, and is incentivized to learn cheap
proxy measures that correlate with the expensive reward. Because EC uses fitness
functions that operate over an individual’s entire evaluation, rather than the per-
timestep rewards of traditional reinforcement learning across an evaluation, it may
not be easy to translate such a paradigm to EC (although it could be an interesting di-
rection for research). One potential way of framing semi-supervised reinforcement
learning for evolutionary RL is to learn a semi-supervised reward predictor (instead
of a policy) that could assign fitness to individuals by observing their sensory-motor
stream.
3.4 Safe Exploration
The problem of safe exploration is how evolution (or individuals capable of life-
time learning) can explore new solutions without ever (or only very rarely) taking
catastrophic actions (that either harm themselves, humans, or other valuable aspects
of the environment). Note that safe exploration remains a problem even if objec-
tives are correctly specified. That is, even if a fitness function correctly identifies all
unacceptable negative side-effects, and a properly-trained agent would eventually
learn to not cause any such effects, during learning an agent learning in the real
world might still request catastrophic actions that would be unacceptable if actually
executed. For example, the cleaning robot may suffer a fitness penalty for break-
ing a vase, but it still needs to learn how, during training, to not break the vase. In
other words, given a robotic controller that behaves safely, there is no guarantee that
an arbitrary mutation of it will also be safe. The danger of exploration is a deep
problem, in that the act of exploration seems inherently to involve risk by stepping
into the unknown. However, humans can often successfully explore new possibil-
ities and emerge relatively unscathed (sometimes using mental models to predict
whether a new strategy would be catastrophic before trying it, somewhat similarly
to model-based reinforcement learning [42]), suggesting that reasonable solutions
may be possible.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11
There are two main ways that real-world accidents from safe exploration can
emerge in EC. First, take the case of learning a plastic policy (e.g. a policy that is ca-
pable of or needs to learn from experience during its lifetime [43, 44]). For example,
a robot might be trained to explore any environment it is embedded within in search
of a particular goal. In effect, such an agent must learn how to explore, and if the de-
ployment plan involves the real world (through embodied evolution, or crossing the
reality gap), then there are risks from unsafe exploration, e.g. in a new environment,
a learned exploratory strategy might lead the robot to damage itself. Second, there
is the case where a learned (non-plastic) policy is either trained in the real world
(embodied evolution), or is fine-tuned in the real world after being trained in sim-
ulation. In this case, exploring the space of policies (through mutations of existing
policies) may result in unsafe policies; for example, in some robotics domains solu-
tions are known to be fragile, i.e. that most mutations result in degenerate (possibly
damaging) behavior [45, 46]. For concreteness, a robot trained to walk successfully
in simulation may lose some performance when transferred across the reality gap,
and there is no guarantee that perturbations of the transferred policy (explored in
hopes they will improve the policy) will not cause the robot to fall and harm itself.
Overall, it may be impossible to solve the issue of safe exploration without in-
volving some form of human oversight. The reason is that learning what is unsafe
seemingly requires either: (1) an accurate model of the world that includes robust
identification of catastrophes, (2) labelled data of all possible causes of unsafe sce-
narios in a domain, or (3) active experience in the domain with feedback from an
overseer that prevents unsafe actions from being taken. All three require either ex-
tensive domain knowledge, e.g. (1) or (2), or direct human intervention (3). In this
way, the problem of safe exploration may be intrinsically tied (like some of the other
problems) to that of scalable oversight: Given that potentially expensive human feed-
back is needed, how can it be gathered and exploited in an efficient way to enable
reliable real-world exploration in EC?
Interestingly, like other problems mentioned here, often the issue of safe explo-
ration in EC currently arises outside the formal scientific process: Domains are un-
realistically constructed that limit risk (e.g. through spartan closed-world design),
and guard-rails to minimize damage to real-world robots and their environment are
engineered on a robot-by-robot or domain-by-domain basis by experimenters (and
failure modes encountered in such experiments may not be deemed of enough sci-
entific import to be published). Thus, one contribution to studying safe exploration
in EC would be to introduce a variant of common ER benchmarks that simulate
the idea of safe embodied evolution; for example, a maze navigation task could in-
clude deep holes that would endanger a robot, or fragile and valuable aspects of the
environment. Another avenue of safe evolutionary exploration relates to the robust-
ness and evolvability of genomes; for example, some EC methods find parts of the
search space that are more robust to mutation [46], or adapt variation operators to in-
crease robustness or evolvability [45, 47], or attempt to enforce small changes to an
evolved policy [48]. The idea is that with well-tuned variation, parent policies that
are safe may be more likely to produce safe children policies, under the assumption
that larger policy changes are more likely to be degenerate.
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EC could also attempt to solve existing safe exploration benchmarks from the
reinforcement learning community, e.g. the safe exploration grid-world of Leike
et al. [49] or domains explored by Moldovan and Abbeel [50]. Potential solutions
could be imported from the traditional ML community’s study of safe exploration in
reinforcement learning [51], such as the approach of Saunders et al. [52], wherein
human oversight is used to train a supervised learning model that blocks unsafe
actions, or Lipton et al. [53], wherein catastrophic actions are explicitly stored and
rehearsed to endow a reinforcement-learning agent with an intrinsic sense of fear.
Similar models could be trained to block unsafe actions for ER or in embodied
evolution.
3.5 Robustness to Distributional Drift
The problem of robustness to distributional shift is how to skillfully deal with the
fact that when AI systems are deployed, they will often encounter situations that de-
viate from the exact ones it was trained upon. Accidents can result in this paradigm
if an agent’s policy results in dangerous actions when encountering new situations.
In some EC communities, such as ER, experiments may not always explore how
well a learned behavior generalizes to situations other than the exact ones experi-
enced in training; i.e. in the language of statistical ML, the training set doubles as
the testing set. As a result, there may be little understanding of how a policy would
generalize, and how pathological a robot’s behavior would be if it encountered a
novel situation. Note that interestingly, the issue of lacking-generalization is a topic
of recent interest in deep reinforcement learning as well [54, 55, 56]. While this
paradigm may not be intrinsically problematic, i.e. if the research question does
not involve generalization or real-world deployment, graceful degradation of out-
of-training-distribution performance becomes critical as policies are deployed in
the real-world (especially open-world scenarios where it is well-understood that cir-
cumstances will change over time).
Several EC communities study partial solutions to this problem. For example,
one subfield of EC studies dynamic fitness landscapes [57, 58], wherein evolution
continues as circumstances change, which could continually align the policy to the
current distribution of scenarios. Further, such fluid adaptation may favor (or be
enabled by mechanisms that encourage) more evolvable representations, i.e. rep-
resentations offering diverse and adaptive variation, another important and related
field of EC study [59, 60]. Complementarily, others in EC study meta-learning [43],
or evolutionary approaches to learning how to learn, which may enable a policy to
quickly learn online from its own mistakes.
While these research communities provide important insights for tackling distri-
butional shift, new benchmark tasks may be needed to ground out the risks from
real-world distributional shift and to determine which (or which combinations) of
these techniques would help ameliorate them in practice. For example, an ER do-
main could be introduced in which environments are produced through procedu-
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ral content generation (PCG; [61]), but where the distribution of PCG parameters
changes over evolutionary time; different approaches could be compared by how
many catastrophic failures are encountered across evolutionary time.
Solutions could potentially be inspired also by study of the problem within ML
at large. For example, the insight in Inverse Reward Design [62] is that the fitness
function encountered during training should only be trusted insofar as it reflects sit-
uations that occur during training (i.e. the human designer of the fitness function
designed it explicitly to solve such training situations); an agent should thus have
uncertainty of what the fitness implications are for new situations. It may be possible
to export such an insight to an evolutionary context, perhaps by querying a human
for guidence or forcing a known safe policy to take over when anomalous circum-
stances are encountered (e.g. as studied by the fields of novelty/anomoly detction
[63, 64] or when an uncertainty-aware ).
4 Discussion
One interesting question is if EC has unique contributions to make to the general
study of AI safety. A potential benefit of evolution relative to traditional ML is its di-
vergent creative potential – evolution seems well-suited to discovering a diversity of
high-quality artifacts; subfields of EC that study artificial life [65], open-endedness
[15], and quality diversity [12] focus on this facet of evolution, which may be of use
for helping in particular with the problem of robustness to distributional shift. That
is, evolution could be driven to discover a wide range of new training situations to
discover latent flaws in learned policies or models, to augment a limited training set
that might not cover the diversity of situations that could later be encountered. For
example, the work of Nguyen et al. [16] applies a QD algorithm to find, in a single
evolutionary run, a set of diverse images that reliably fool a deep neural network
vision model; following work has shown that these kinds of adversarial images can
provide safety hazards for real-world use cases of such vision models [66, 67]. Sim-
ilar principles from QD or open-endedness can be used to evolve scenarios to test
robotic policies. Work in this spirit includes Goldsby and Cheng [68], wherein nov-
elty search and GP are used to probe latent behavior of a robotic navigation system
and an automobile door locking control system. Similarly, the environments evolved
by open-ended systems like POET [69] could be adapted as a testing suite for fixed
policies.
A separate but related question is to consider what lessons biological evolution
has for AI safety. Many problems faced by AI safety have been solved, at least in
some abstract sense, by biology. For example, the problem of negative side effects
in AI safety is related to the evolution of cooperation and sociality in biology, in that
cooperation often entails considering other agents and their goals in addition to one’s
own goal (whether through behavioral convention, e.g. as in bees, or deliberative
thought as in humans); from this perspective, the negative side effects of a robot
pursuing its own limited agenda result from not understanding and/or taking into
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account the broader preferences of outside agents (e.g. that a vase is a valuable
artifact and should not be broken while cleaning a room). Humans have evolved
moral instincts, the ability to empathizewith others, and verbal and written language,
all of which helps us to understand the gestalt of a task another human might ask
us to perform (which can help to avoid reward hacking and negative side effects).
Similarly, the robustness of our genetic architecture to random mutations and the
natural instincts of curiosity and fear are nature’s hard-won solution to the problem
of safe exploration on both a genetic and individual level. In the same way that
evolution (and EC) have a privileged position when it comes to human-level AI
(because evolution is the way in which human intelligence came into existence), so
too evolution and EC may have privileged position when it comes to the AI safety
challenges that biology has in some sense solved.
Another question is if methods in EC may manifest different kinds of AI safety
concerns than those considered within traditional ML, e.g. due to their lack of for-
mal gradient-following or because they might seek to produce AI as the result of a
divergent creative process (as opposed to optimizing an explicit objective function
as common in most ML). As a result, it is unclear whether the safety agendas cur-
rently popular in ML [3, 5, 6] are applicable to AI produced by paradigms such as
evolutionary artificial life or open-ended evolution, which in their grandest aspira-
tions (just as in traditional ML or AI) include producing agents with human-level
intelligence [70]. We believe this is a question deserving of more study.
A final discussion topic is to draw together some of the recurring themes from
considering each AI safety problem separately, in hopes of highlighting promising
research questions and paradigms. One theme is the potential need for modifica-
tions of EC benchmarks to include safety considerations or the adoption of existing
AI safety benchmarks within EC. Benchmarks, for better or worse, help draw re-
searcher attention, and can make seemingly nebulous problems more concrete. Be-
cause existing EC domains and benchmarksminimize safety concerns by design (be-
cause researchers most often are pursuing research questions orthogonal to safety),
new benchmarksmay help to catalyze safety research, especially if they are variants
of domains familiar to EC researchers. For example, EC techniques could be ap-
plied to the AI safety grid-worlds of Leike et al. [49], or existing ER domains (such
as maze navigation or ball-gathering) could be augmented with catastrophic actions
(for investigating safe exploration) or in which held-out test environments would
test for robustness to distributional shift. Another overarching theme is the potential
for some form of IEC to help in the solution to nearly all of the reviewed problems;
this is not surprising, because many AI safety problems emerge precisely because
human insight is relegated to constructing a fixed setup (i.e. in EC the genetic en-
coding and the fitness function), and IEC is a framework for allowing human choice
to intervene during evolution. Safety considerations may drive more efficient ways
to perform IEC (through improved surrogate models), as well as the construction of
new forms of IEC. For example, IEC most often helps steer what individuals repro-
duce, but IEC solutions to problems such as safe exploration may require humans to
interact more directly with policies as they execute, i.e. to intervene to prevent un-
safe actions. One source of inspiration may be systems such as the neuroevolution-
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based game NERO [71], in which a human experimenter can interact in real time to
dynamically change the environment, parameters of the fitness function, and even
embody a virtual agent to probe learned agent behaviors.
5 Conclusion
AI safety is an important research topic for enabling EC to reach one of its aspira-
tions, which is to maximize its beneficial real-world impact. At first glance, such re-
search might seem uninteresting, because it can evoke sentiments of domain-specific
engineering, rather than the pursuit of grand scientific questions; however, AI safety
enfolds interesting and philosophically deep unsolved technical challenges, includ-
ing how to avoid catastrophe while learning about the world, and how to create
fitness functions that incentivize agents to do what we intend them to do. As ML
and AI grow in import, we can expect funding and interest in AI safety to similarly
grow, and the hope of this paper is to advocate for EC researchers to both contribute
and take note of advances in this developing field.
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